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CASE NOTES
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-ADMISSIBILITY OF INVOLUNTARY
CHEMICAL TESTS TO DETERMINE INTOXICATION
Defendant was charged with operating an automobile while under the
influence of intoxicating liquor and with reckless driving. After his arrest
defendant was placed in restraining straps and his head was held while a
specimen of his breath was taken for a drunkometer test. Upon certifica-
tion to the Supreme Court of Arizona for an advisory opinion, it was
held that the results of a drunkometer test 1 were admissible in evidence
notwithstanding the fact that the specimen of breath analyzed was taken
from the defendant by force, so long as it was captured after it had
passed his lips or nostrils. Furthermore, it was held that the admission
of such evidence was neither in violation of the defendant's federal nor
state constitutional rights guaranteeing due process of law, freedom from
self-incrimination, and unreasonable search and seizure. State v. Berg,
259 P. 2d 261 (Ariz., 1953).
With regard generally to the admissibility of evidence procured
through the employment of chemical tests for the determination of in-
toxication, an increasing number of jurisdictions have adhered to the view
that such evidence is admissible-a view unquestionably gaining wider
acceptance as constant improvement in the apparatus employed renders
more accurate the results obtained. 2 In addition to the chemical analysis
of breath,a examinations of the blood, 4 and urine,5 have been held ad-
missible.
A more delicate query is in issue, it would seem, where such examina-
tion or test is induced by compulsion. The court in the instant case holds
this implication to be of little moment, however, basing its decision
1 It was stipulated that the results of the drunkometer test were the only evidence
of the defendant's intoxication.
2 In the recent Illinois case of People v. Bobczyk, 343 Ill. App. 504, 99 N.E. 2d 567
(1951), noted in 1 De Paul L. Rev. 298 (1952), it was held that the admission into
evidence of the results of a drunkometer test was not error even though such tests
have not received general scientific approval. There the test was submitted to volun-
tarily. Contra: People v. Morse, 325 Mich. 270, 38 N.W. 2d 322 (1949).
a Spider v. State, 221 Ind. 107, 46 N.E. 2d 591 (1943); People v. Bobczyk, 343 I11.
App. 504, 99 N.E. 2d 567 (1951); Toms v. State, 239 P. 2d 812 (Okla. Cr., 1952); McKay
v. State, 235 S.W. 2d 173 (Tex. Cr., 1951).
4Block v. People, 240 P. 2d 512 (Colo., 1951); People v. Abbott, 101 Cal. App. 2d
200, 225 P. 2d 283 (1950).
5 State v. Duguid, 50 Ariz. 276, 72 P. 2d 435 (1937).
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solely upon the proposition that evidence which is material to the issues,
is not inadmissible because it was illegally obtained.6
The court adhered to the view expressed in State v. Frye.7
The constitutional provision was not meant to assist a guilty criminal in
escaping the penalty for his misdeeds, but to protect certain rights belonging
to all men alike .... 8
Thus, it was held that the results of a drunkometer test, being admissible
as evidence of the defendant's intoxication, 9 were not rendered inad-
missible by virtue of the fact that they were obtained by force and
over the objection of the defendant. 10
While this reasoning is undoubtedly in accord with the holdings in the
majority of the states, 1 its application is confined to the prohibition
normally found in state constitutions against unreasonable searches and
seizures12 and does not apply to evidence secured which violates the
provision against self-incrimination. Nevertheless, in disposing of the force
of the unreasonable provision against searches and seizures,"3 the court
said:
Officers making the arrest had the lawful right to capture his breath ...
So long as they limited their operation to the capture of his breath after it
left his body by means which only slightly interfered temporarily with
his freedom of action he had no legal right to obstruct their efforts. If he
did obstruct them they had the right to use such force upon defendant as
appeared to be reasonably necessary to overcome such interference. 14
Even though most courts allow the introduction of evidence disclosed
by search made upon a person during lawful arrest,15 it is probably the
6 The Federal rule is contra and a minority of the states follow this rule, as ex-
pressed in Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914); People v. Grod, 385 Ill. 584,
53 N.E. 2d 591 (1944); People v. Brocamp, 307 Ill. 448, 138 N.E. 728 (1923).
7 58 Ariz. 409, 120 P. 2d 793 (1942).
8 Ibid., at 417 and 797.
0 Cases cited notes 4-6 supra. For a very interesting and enlightening discussion of
the chemical aspects of the tests see: Ladd and Gibson, The Medico-legal Aspects
of the Blood Test to Determine Intoxication, 24 Iowa L. Rev. 191 (1939).
10 So long as the breath was taken after it left the lips or nose of the defendant.
11State v. Pelosi, 68 Ariz. 51, 199 P. 2d 125 (1948); State v. Frye, 58 Ariz. 409,
120 P. 2d 793 (1942); People v. Defore, 242 N.Y. 13, 150 N.E. 585 (1926); and see
8 Wigmore, Evidence §§ 2183, 2184 (3d ed., 1940).
12 Ariz. Const. Art. II, § 8.
13 Article II, Section 8 of the Arizona Constitution provides: "No person shall
disturbed in his private affairs, or his home invaded, without authority of law."
14 State v. Berg, 259 P. 2d 261, 265 (Ariz., 1953).
15 United States v. O'Brien, 174 F. 2d 341 (C.A. 7th, 1949); see United States v.
Mills, 185 Fed. 318 (C.C. N.Y., 1911).
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better view that chemical tests, like physical examinations, do not
come within the scope of this constitutional privilege. 16
The question was similarly raised as to whether such sobriety tests
violated the constitutional privilege against self-incrimination.17 Answer-
ing in the negative, the court relied upon the decision in Holt v. United
States,'8 wherein the privilege was held to apply solely to testimonial com-
pulsions, and did not embrace "an exclusion of his [defendant's] body as
evidence when it may be material."'19
Though the authorities are in disagreement as to the scope of the
immunity,2 ° the courts have permitted the introduction of material
evidence discovered by the use of compulsory finger-printing, 21 measur-
ing of shoes and feet,2 2 compelling defendant to display himself in certain
garments,23 and comparing shoes with disputed footprints. 24 Professor
Wigmore expresses an opinion in accord with that of the court in the
instant case when he says, ". . . the object of the protection seems
plain. It is the employment of legal process to extract from the person's
own lips an admission of his guilt, which will then take the place of
other evidence. '25
Thus, while there are some decisions to the contrary, the weight of
authority holds the chemical tests under discussion not a violation of
the privilege against self-incrimination. Most of these courts exclude
from the privilege evidence not gained by testimonial utterance from
the lips of the defendant. 26
However, many courts have based similar decisions holding the
doctrine of self-incrimination inapplicable upon the theory that so
16 People v. Krauser, 315 Ill. 485, 146 N.E. 593 (1925); State v. Alexander, 7 N.J.
585, 83 A. 2d 441 (1951).
17 "No person shall be compelled in any criminal case to give evidence against
himself or be twice put in jeopardy for the same offense." Ariz. Const. Art. II, § 10.
18 218 U.S. 245 (1910). Accord: State v. Graham, 116 La. 779, 41 So. 90 (1906).
For a complete discussion of the privilege see, Inbau, Self-Incrimination-What Can
an Accused Person Be Compelled to Do? 28 J. Crim. L. & Criminology 261 (1937).
19 Holt v. United States, 218 U.S. 245, 253 (1910).
20 Apodaca v. State, 140 Tex. Cr. 593, 146 S.W. 2d 381 (1940); Booker v. Cincinnati,
1 Ohio Supp. 152 (1936).
21 United States v. Kelly, 55 F. 2d 67 (C.A. 2d, 1932).
22State v. Smith, 133 S.C. 291, 130 S.E. 884 (1925); State v. Graham, 116 La. 779,
41 So. 90 (1906).
2a Holt v. United States, 218 U.S. 245 (1910).
24People v. Totten, 381 Il. 538, 46 N.E. 2d 70 (1943); Biggs v. State, 201 Ind. 200,
167 N.E. 129 (1929); Lee v. State, 27 Ariz. 52, 229 P. 939 (1924).
258 Wimore, Evidence § 2263 (3d ed., 1940).
20 State v. Cram, 176 Ore. 577, 160 P. 2d 283 (1945); and cases cited notes 21-23 supra.
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long as the defendant did not resist the chemical test, there was no
compulsion. 27 It was held by the Supreme Court of Arizona in State
v. Duguid'2 8 that if no compulsion is shown, the evidence is admissible.
The decision in the instant case would seem to be a departure from
this prior holding, but the court here makes a distinction between the
use of chemical analyses of breath and of urine, the latter being at issue
in the Duguid case.
Likewise the court in the instant case disposes of the principle
enunciated in the recent case of Rochin v. California,29 wherein an emetic
solution was forced through a tube into the stomach of the defendant
against his will for the purpose of producing capsules of morphine which
he had swallowed. A majority of the Supreme Court of the United
States in that case held that such methods were in violation of the due
process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. In separate concurring
opinions, Justices Black and Douglas relied upon the prohibition against
self-incrimination, expressly granted by the Fifth Amendment which
they felt to be incorporated into the Fourteenth Amendment.
While the "incorporation theory" has not found acceptance by the
Supreme Court of the United States, much may be said in support of the
concept that unfair practices which offend the basic and fundamental
rights of man are in violation of the due process clause. Whether or not
the forceful taking of a sample of breath over the objection of the
defendant constitutes such violation is yet a question for interpretation
by the Supreme Court, but in the Rochin case it was said,
In deciding this case we do not heedlessly bring into question decisions in
many States dealing with essentially different, even if related, problems. We
therefore put to one side cases which have arisen in the State courts through
the use of modern methods and devices for discovering wrongdoers and
bringing them to book. It does not fairly represent these decisions to sug-
gest that they legalize force so brutal and so offensive to human dignity in
securing evidence from a suspect as is revealed by this record.3 0
The court in the instant case was aware of the Rochin case, but found
no similarity whatever in that case to the case at bar.
In concluding that there were no federal constitutional issues in-
volved, the court adhered to the view expressed in Twining v. State of
27 Touchton v. State, 154 Fla. 547, 18 S. 2d 752 (1944); State v. Werling, 234 Iowa
1109, 13 N.W. 2d 318 (1944); State v. Small, 233 Iowa 1280, 11 N.W. 2d 377 (1943);
Spitler v. State, 221 Ind. 107, 46 N.E. 2d 591 (1943); State v. Duguid, 53 Ariz. 276,
72 P. 2d 435 (1937).
2 8 53Ariz. 276, 72 P. 2d 435 (1937).
29 342 U.S. 165 (1952).
80 Ibid., at 174.
CASE NOTES
New Jersey3 1 to the effect that the Fourth and Fifth Amendments to the
constitution of the United States have no application to the trial of
cases in state courts, and the due process clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment affords no protection against self-incrimination. 32
In conclusion it is seen that most of the courts that have dealt
with the matter have admitted into evidence the results of chemical tests
where the tests were administered voluntarily, but have become concerned
where the tests were taken under compulsion, or not on a purely volun-
tary basis.
To be sure, the relationship of alcohol to automobile accidents and
the role which it plays in the growing death toll on the highways of the
nation, renders it a problem of the first magnitude. The questions in-
volved in the use of compulsion to administer chemical tests moreover
involve many social as well as constitutional factors and must, for their
complete determination, abide the limitations placed by public policy
and the natural reluctance on the part of the courts to admit evidence
procured by force to sustain future criminal prosecution.
With heavier penalites being imposed on persons convicted of driving
while under the influence of intoxicating liquors,33 as in Illinois, it is
exceedingly doubtful whether it be a wise policy to permit police
officers to force a chemical test upon an unwilling motorist. The op-
portunities for abuse of the power and the temptation to attempt to
bribe the arresting officers before they carry out the test would be strong
indeed.
PARENT AND CHILD-PARENT HELD LIABLE
FOR UNAUTHORIZED MEDICAL SERVICES
RENDERED CHILD
A physician brought action against the parents of a minor child, to
recover a reasonable fee for professional services rendered to the
child without express authorization by the parents. The Supreme Court
of New Jersey reversing the lower courts, held that where a physician,
to whom the child was sent by physician's co-suitor, did not act
officiously and intended to make a charge for services, the child's parents,
31211 U.S. 78 (1908).
32 Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319 (1937).
33 111. Rev. Stat. (1951) c. 95 , § 144, as amended, 1953, June 24, Laws 1953, H.B.
No. 475, S 1. The amendment provides as follows: "(a) It is unlawful and punish-
able as provided in subdivision (b) of this section for any person who . . . is under
the influence of intoxicating liquor or narcotic drug to drive any vehicle within this
state. (b) Every person who is convicted of a violation of this section shall be punished
by imprisonment for not less than two days nor more than 1 year, or by fine of not
less than $100 dollars nor more than $1000 or by both such fine and imprisonment."
